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Abstract
The importance of protecting individual property rights has been widely accepted. By con-
trast, the unequivocalness of individual land property rights, especially its role as collat-
eral, has been widely debated. This study discusses an alternative system, land pawning, 
which enables people to borrow without land property rights. Based on studies on Ja-
panese early modern period, this study argues that land pawning and credit transactions 
were active even without a land property system. Japanese early modern history suggests 
that establishing a land property right is not a prerequisite for the development of finan-
cial activities. The Japanese early modern land and taxation system also suggests a close 
link between land-based taxation and a land-based credit system. Institutionalist studies 
ignore the role of taxation in the land system and collateral-backed finance. T here i s a 
theoretical discrepancy between the availability of land for use as collateral and inducing 
industrial investment. This gap within the various institutionalist arguments needs to be 
closed.





The widely accepted discussion of the ‘tragedy of commons’ represented by Hardin (1968)
implanted in our minds the idea that the absence of land property ownership leads to de-
gradation and loss of property values. It also shattered our utopian image of communal
land. Associated with this view, the so-called institutionalists, represented by North and
Thomas (1973) and North (1990) established the belief that institutions, especially cent-
ral governments and judicial authorities that protect private property rights, are critical
to enforcing the ‘rules of the game’ in the market economy. To date, their views have
had a strong influence on economic analyses, international development policies, agrarian
reforms and land registration programs in many countries, and even on the statistical
indicators published by international organizations.
The importance of land property rights is especially significant in the development of
the credit market. Given information asymmetry and incomplete contracts, lenders often
demand collateral or a mortgage to secure their lending. Various studies in economics,
such as De Soto (2000), highlight the necessity of establishing private property rights or
land ownership to ensure the availability of collateral and enable people to lend, borrow,
insure, and invest.
Still, the long history of human debt suggests that even before establishing religious
systems human societies had innovated various systems to enable people to borrow money,
despite the lack of well institutionalized individual property rights and the rule of law that
protect them (Graeber 2011). Land registration and titling are such a complicated project
that private property rights are neither a universally consolidated idea nor an ancient
institution. If demand for credit is universal and permanent in human economic activities,
then conversely, there must be other conventional and alternative systems that enable
people to borrow money.
This paper aims to re-examine the widely believed unequivocalness of individual land
property rights by reviewing some examples of alternative systems, such as land pawn-
ing and usufruct collateral, especially in the case of early modern Japan. Japan is often
recognized as being equipped with institutions based on individual land property rights
and the rule of law. It is also the first country in Asia to have completed agrarian reform
after World War II. However, this understanding masks the fact that private land property
rights in Japan are relatively new when compared with Western countries. The notion of
‘private land ownership’ first came into being after the provision of title deeds and land tax
reform in the Meiji era (1873-1881), followed by the introduction of Meiji Civil Law in 1896
(Matsuo 2018). By contrast, the economy was already thriving in the Edo period, even by
world standards, without the institutional system of legal individual land property rights
(Okazaki 1999). How was this possible? What are the limitations of these alternative
systems? Furthermore, what can we learn from these examples?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the conflicting
views over the role of institutions, especially individual land property rights. Section 3
introduces historical examples of alternative financial intermediation without individual
property rights. Based on this understanding, section 4 revisits and discusses the recent
institutionalist views. The final section concludes with a tentative reassessment of the
views on land property rights.
2. The conflicting views on the role of land property rights
The institutional economists (or new institutional economics) regard effective institutions
such as the rule of law, governance, or informal norms, as ‘the rules of the game’ and thus
indispensable for economic growth (Rutherford 2001). North and Thomas (1973) and North
(1990) are representative of such views. Whereas these studies are based on neoclassical
economic understandings, De Soto (1989, 2000), by contrast, argues that the weakness of
these institutions and the absence of private property rights explain the stagnation in the
economic growth of countries that are abundant with resources such as land but without
sound functioning institutions. According to De Soto, abundant land and forest become
assets once they are registered and protected by the legal system, which can be used as
collateral for mortgages to facilitate investment (De Soto 2000).
These (though mixed) institutionalist views have become the implicit assumption of a
wide range of economics studies. Agricultural economists have supported similar argu-
ments to De Soto. One of the main reasons for promoting agrarian reforms and fostering
the land market in developing countries is the belief that land titling consolidation will ac-
celerate land transactions. Those with greater ability and productivity will gain the land
to maximize land productivity, which leads to enhanced agricultural productivity on the
whole. It is also suggested that the availability of land for use as collateral will promote
investment in land through access to credit for agricultural input and techniques, which
leads to higher land productivity (Feder et al. 1988, Feder and Feeny 1991, Feder and
Nishio 1999).
Conversely, it is widely accepted that institutional quality matters to the functioning of
the financial system, which affects economic growth or industrialization (Teranishi 1991,
― 4―
ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 1 (2021) The economy of pawning: Institutionalism revisited
1. Introduction
The widely accepted discussion of the ‘tragedy of commons’ represented by Hardin (1968)
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institutionalist views. The final section concludes with a tentative reassessment of the
views on land property rights.
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such as the rule of law, governance, or informal norms, as ‘the rules of the game’ and thus
indispensable for economic growth (Rutherford 2001). North and Thomas (1973) and North
(1990) are representative of such views. Whereas these studies are based on neoclassical
economic understandings, De Soto (1989, 2000), by contrast, argues that the weakness of
these institutions and the absence of private property rights explain the stagnation in the
economic growth of countries that are abundant with resources such as land but without
sound functioning institutions. According to De Soto, abundant land and forest become
assets once they are registered and protected by the legal system, which can be used as
collateral for mortgages to facilitate investment (De Soto 2000).
These (though mixed) institutionalist views have become the implicit assumption of a
wide range of economics studies. Agricultural economists have supported similar argu-
ments to De Soto. One of the main reasons for promoting agrarian reforms and fostering
the land market in developing countries is the belief that land titling consolidation will ac-
celerate land transactions. Those with greater ability and productivity will gain the land
to maximize land productivity, which leads to enhanced agricultural productivity on the
whole. It is also suggested that the availability of land for use as collateral will promote
investment in land through access to credit for agricultural input and techniques, which
leads to higher land productivity (Feder et al. 1988, Feder and Feeny 1991, Feder and
Nishio 1999).
Conversely, it is widely accepted that institutional quality matters to the functioning of
the financial system, which affects economic growth or industrialization (Teranishi 1991,
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King and Levine 1993, Levine 1997). In their closely related study, La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) argue that legal institutions, especially the differences in the origins of the legal
system between Common Law and Roman Law, matter for the development of the financial
market. Such views have strongly influenced the formation of the understanding that
institutional quality, especially the rule of law, affects financial deepening, in turn affecting
the speed of economic growth.
The introduction of Doing Business, a set of popular indices about the business environ-
ment first published by the World Bank in 2003, has further bolstered this view. Djankov
(2016) explains that this indicator was strongly influenced by Levine’s, La Porta’s, and
De Soto’s studies. He reveals that out of five indicators in Doing Business, the indicator
for access to credit, the strength of legal rights which encompasses the protection of bor-
rowers and lenders by collateral and bankruptcy law, was based on an empirical study by
Djankov et al. (2007) about the availability of private credit. Whereas the studies on finan-
cial deepening and business mainly discuss the legal functioning and quality of financial
institutions, they are implicitly based on private asset security guaranteed by the rule of
law.
Related to this point, Demachi (2019) discusses how the financial boom in Africa, espe-
cially in Ghana after 2011, did not lead to investment in the real economic sector, because
ambiguous land property rights in African countries inevitably hampered the supply of
long term credit by financial institutions. Thus there is a ‘missing link’ between financial
market development and real economic sector growth. This argument was also based on
the assumption that the availability of land or buildings as collateral is indispensable for
financial intermediation by financial institutions.
Closely related to these views, a number of agrarian reforms and land registration
programs have been implemented in developing countries. Binswanger and Rosenzweig
(1986), for example, discuss the characteristics of various collateral types and describe
land as the ideal collateral once title registration is accomplished and enforcement of the
contract is guaranteed. Deininger (2003) is a comprehensive overview of land tiling, rep-
resentative of the World Bank’s view. This study’s main message is that establishment of
land property rights will promote investment, poverty reduction, and better governance.
The importance of individual land property rights or enforcement of the law to protect
private property seems rational, and its necessity seems obvious to economics students.
However, land titling and property registration projects implemented in developing coun-
tries are often criticized. In contrast to the proponents of land titling, Boserup (1965)
mentions the possibility that land titling may lead to tenure being less secure. She also
discusses litigation problems regarding land titling between the illiterate and the advant-
aged in former colonial countries, and points to the increase in conflicts between farmers
as the population grows and fallow land becomes scarce.
Van den Brink et al. (2006) point out that land titling and provision of land deeds do
not necessarily lead to collateral-backed lending. They suggest that title deeds will not
have the supposed effect unless the institutions, such as government authorities, have
the trusted capacity to guarantee the validity of deeds. It is worth noting that Fleisig
et al. (2006) do not directly support the mere introduction of land titling. Given that in
most developing countries financial institutions only take immovable property such as land
and buildings as collateral, they suggest the necessity for legal reform that allows various
alternative assets including movables to serve as collateral to bolster people’s access to
financial services.
Closely related to this point, there is also a view that access to financial services or
financial inclusion is essential in terms of supporting entrepreneurship, or more generally,
small and medium-sized enterprises. However, Domeher and Abdulai (2012) argue that
land titling will not necessarily enhance credit access in developing countries. Lenders
may put more weight on other factors such as cash flow and creditworthiness in stead of
land-based collateral. By contrast, borrowers refrain from using the land title as collateral
for fear of losing the land, which is the foundation of their living.
While many studies question the efficacy of land registration and the establishment of
individual land property rights, it is hard to dismiss society’s need for credit, given the eco-
nomic success of industrialized countries. Therefore, we need to ask what the alternatives
to finance backed by land as collateral are.
3. Alternative systems
3.1. Pawning
Once we look past the perceived notion of the formalized legal system we are accustomed to
in developed economies today, several alternative and conventional systems emerge. People
finance and smooth out their consumption and expenditure, sometimes without individual
legal property registration.
One such system is pawning. Pawning is still practiced today, but it functions without
the formal, regal systems. Pawning, or more precisely, pawnbroking is distinguished from
other lending schemes in that pawnbrokers take physical possession of the pledge. Thus
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the pledged asset does not remain with the borrower (Skully 1994: 358). This is a clear
difference from other lending based on collateral. Collateral is not physically possessed
by the lender until the borrower defaults, and thus it requires legal procedures such as
registration to take out a mortgage on an asset. Given this distinction, pawning usually
takes movables as the pledge. Conversely, today’s secured finance often takes immovable
property such as lands and buildings or registered movables such as cars and airplanes as
collateral. 1
In many countries, land has historically been used as a pledge for loans and in some
places this practice continues today. However, in societies without a land property rights
system, it is not strictly the land itself that is pawned, but rather the usufruct. In most
places and times, borrowers do not ‘own’ the land, and the pledged land cannot be officially
foreclosed.
Despite this ostensibly flawed and conflicting functioning, land or usufruct pawning
was and is still practiced in a number of regions and countries, such as the Philippines
(sangla) (Nagarajan et al.1991a, Nagarajan et al. 1991b, Fukui 1995), India (Swaminathan
1991, Shibli 1993, Bell and Hatlebakk 2017), Bangladesh (Jabbar et al. 1980), Indonesia
(Nurdin and Tegnan 2019), Senegal (Galvan 1997), and early modern Japan.
Most of these studies focus on agricultural land, and the analyses are closely related
to the agricultural investment, productivity, and livings of rural households. At the same
time, demand for credit is not an exclusive nature of farmers and rural areas but also of
urban residents. One reason for the scarcity of studies about urban areas is that most
people tend not to occupy land plots but only a small piece of land that is more often
recognized as a part of a building.
Nakata’s (1984) interesting study describes urban financing activities without indi-
vidual property rights and introduces various types of conventional pawning and collateral
practiced by urban residents in early modern Japan by using descriptions that appeared
in the famous old literature published in the Edo period (1603-1868). In the cities, people
used various things as the pawn pledge, such as clothing, family members, houses, letting
and rented rooms, residential rights, land, usufruct, shares (stocks), and bills of payment.
However, the following subsection’s focus is restricted to pawning in village areas.
1A notable exception is human pawning, observed, not only, but especially, in West Africa under the colonial era
(Law 1994).
3.2. Land pawning in Japan
An extensive description of the Japanese land system is beyond this study’s scope. How-
ever, it is widely recognized that the foundation of the modern land system was started by
the nation-wide land survey by Hideyoshi Toyotomi in 1582 (taikoh-kenchi) (Ishii 1982). It
is worth noting that even before this land survey, land transactions, including land pawn-
ing, were already practiced in medieval Japan (Takeuchi 1973).
In the following Edo period, the feudal system was consolidated, and the land was
allocated by the central Tokugawa government to the feudal lords (daimyo). The land was
associated with tax obligations measured by its agricultural productivity and fulfilled not
only but mainly by rice (Yamauchi 2008). Takatsuki et al. (2017) mention that the tax
ratio and the burden were relatively high, especially compared with those in medieval
times. The feudal lords were managers rather than owners of the land, as land sales were
prohibited. Within each feudal area, agricultural villages were allotted farmland with its
tax obligation. From this perspective, land usage and tax obligation were communal but
not individual nor household, at least at the beginning of the Edo period.
The abundant studies on the land system of the Edo period (almost exclusively in Ja-
panese with a few exceptions such as Smith (1959)) refer to land being transacted and
pawned even under the official prohibition of land sales. For example, Ishii (1982) refers to
the second half of the Edo period when land pawning was active among the farmers. Ac-
cording to Kitajima (1975), agricultural land was leased, sold with repurchase contracts,
or pawned. Under Tokugawa’s rule, the first order of prohibition of permanent land sales
was announced in 1642 (denpata eitai baibai kinshirei), and in 1722 the government also
announced the prohibition of foreclosure on pawned land (ryuchi kinshirei). However, the
latter was soon repealed (Kitajima 1975). The government prohibition of land sales and
foreclosure can be seen as evidence of active land-based credit transactions. Okazaki (1999)
further suggests that there were multiple announcements by the government, almost once
in every twenty years in the Edo period, that the legal authority would not sit in judge-
ment over the finance-related disputes among commoners (aitai sumashi rei).2 This can
also be understood as evidence of the increase in financial activities causing the demand
for official intervention to surpass the government’s administrative capacity.
There were occasional government orders for private debt relief (Okazaki 1999, Mandai
et al. 2017). This also supports the view that financial activities in this period were profuse
to the extent that they exacerbated the incidence of poverty on one hand and the accumula-
2Kitajima (1975) suggests that this order set several exceptions, including disputes of land-backed financial
contracts.
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tion of wealth in the hands of a small number of people, on the other, resulting in economic
inequality. The economic system required periodic resetting.
Whereas land pawning was common in this period, the alienation of land usufruct to
other villages was avoided in most cases. Based on the materials left by Kyugu Tanaka
(1662-1739), Takatsuki et al.(2017) mention cases in which village land was pawned to a
group within the same villages that organized ROSCAs (rotating saving and credit associ-
ations, mujin, kou) to avoid selling land.
Among the numerous studies on the land system in early modern Japan, Yamauchi
(2008) is noteworthy in revealing the relationship between land pawning and the tax ob-
ligation. Yamauchi’s study is a paleographic study based on the land and tax record of a
village in Shinshu (today Nagano prefecture) from 1756 to the end of the Edo period. He
introduces several cases in which villagers absconded from the village for some reason.
The abandoned land (paddy field) was pawned to other villagers, sometimes even to people
outside of the village. Because the abandoned land plots were associated with the tax ob-
ligation (rice production) allocated among the villagers, the obligation was not exempted
even in the case of the disappearance or demise of farmers who worked on the plots. In
that sense, pawning of land or usufruct was inevitable to supplement the loss of agricul-
tural production with borrowed cash. This case reveals the possibility that land-based tax
obligations accelerated the demand for credit by using land and usufruct as the pledge.
This point is compelling given that in most of human history, the top reason for debt
has been taxation (Graeber 2011). If taxation is closely linked with debt, it also means that
there is a close relationship between taxation and development of the credit system.
It is widely understood that, in the Edo period, the cadastre was kept and managed by
the village, not the central authority (Yamauchi 2008, Takatsuki et al. 2017, Mandai et
al. 2017). While Yamauchi argues that village characteristics gradually transformed from
commons to administrative units through the Edo period, this also suggests that land and
tax management was decentralized in early modern Japan. The resource management,
both land and labor, was left in the hands of people living and working on the land.
3.3. Taxation and credit system
The examples of land pawning in rural villages in the Japanese Edo period suggest the pos-
sibility that there was a close correlation between the land-based tax system and the de-
velopment of land-based credit. In the Japanese case, the rule and influence of the central
authority (Edo bakufu) was indeed strong. However, land property rights and titling were
not based on individuals or families but rather on the regional community and villages.
Tax obligations were levied on villages according to the land size and productivity, but the
land and tax contribution quota was allocated within each village. The tradition of wari-
chi, a system that rotated land allocation among the villagers to pool the risk of natural
disasters and differences in productivity characterizes this point (Okuda 2004, Sato 2010).
These communal village characteristics transformed gradually as the market economy de-
veloped in early modern Japan. As agricultural techniques developed and investment in
each land plot increased, land transactions accelerated, and the sense of individualism and
private land ownership strengthened (Miyazaki 1977).
Imposing land-based tax is equivalent to setting standard or minimum criteria for the
productivity of the land. In the sense of capitalism and the market economy, land trans-
actions promote land productivity. Those who cannot exploit the most from the land for
any reason, such as a shortage in the household labor force, will sell the plot to those who
will manage and use it better and meet the production criteria, or even exceed it. Under
land-based tax obligations, especially in rural areas in early modern Japan, households
that could not meet the tax obligation would have sold or pawned the land to a household
rich in family members or other resources.
Binswanger suggests that land needs to be scarce to be valued as collateral (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig 1986, Binswanger and Van den Brink 2011). Similarly, Joireman (2008)
points out that in places where land value is not high, the cost of land registration is too
high, which inhibits the development of the system. In terms of scarcity of resources,
rural villages’ situation in the Edo period can be seen as an artificially built mixed condi-
tion. Land, mostly irrigated paddy field, was scarce, but human resources were sometimes
also too scarce to meet the productivity criteria because of the tax obligation. This dual
scarcity promoted land transactions and the development of a land-based credit system.
Importantly, based on Niwa (1962), Tanaka (1997) argues that through the Edo period the
Japanese land system gradually transformed so that within the same official institutional
frame, land transactions between villagers and relatively wealthy farmers increased and
new landowner (jinushi) class emerged. This new landowner class triggered and enabled
relatively smooth (despite being associated with civil wars) land-tax reform in the Meiji
era after the Tokugawa rule (Keene 2002).
Japanese history clearly shows that it is not the land reform and consolidation of
private land ownership, that enhanced land transactions and increased land value. The
causal path was the other way around; informal land transactions within and between the
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communities led to land reform. Others also share this finding. Van den Brink and others
suggest that the security of land property rights is strengthened because of intensified in-
dividual investment in the land, not the other way around (Van den Brink et al. 2006: 9).
Bardhan and Udry (1999) also mention that in rural areas in developing countries com-
munal land use is traditionally restricted. As the population pressure increases, and as
inequality in labor power and productive assets increase, the communal band and tradi-
tional restrictions loosen. This change is often associated with more active immigration
and emigration from the community and increases in non-agricultural economic activities.
3.4. Taxation and institution
While taxation and credit systems seem to have a strong correlation, tax obligations evokes
uprisings against the ruling authorities, especially when the tax burden is too heavy re-
lative to the agricultural production. Fujino (2020), for example, studies the history of
people’s violence in the early modern Japanese villages and suggests that there were many
violent revolts by villagers recorded through the Edo period to demand tax reduction and
other means of poverty alleviation. The farmers’ revolts were one method of appealing to
the public, as there was a certain ‘manner of revolt’ shared by peasants in the Edo period.
Fujino points out that the violence intensified in the later Edo period because of the de-
velopment of the market economy and increased economic inequality and poverty in the
villages. This is not to suggest that taxation and credit system development are inevit-
ably associated with revolt and violence, but a necessity of institutional development that
bolsters both the placement of obligation by the authority and people’s rights to appeal
through a formal process.
The influence of taxation on land productivity and its value seems to be quite large, but
most of the studies that focus on institutions and land systems lack this point. The dis-
cussion by North and Thomas (1973) only briefly touch on taxation, relating to the debt of
monarchs or the government, or on taxation policy influencing the distribution of landhold-
ings in France. This topic was not a favorite of the institutionalists that followed. Kalkuhl
et al. (2018) is one of the few studies on land taxation in developing countries. They sup-
port the introduction of land rent tax as a government revenue source and suggest that
there are also positive side effects such as consolidation of land property rights, sustain-
able growth, increase in investment, and poverty reduction. They see land registration as
a prerequisite of land taxation, based on the understanding that the cost of establishing
the basic cadastral requirement is ‘not prohibitive’.
A discussion of the feasibility of imposing a land-based tax system is beyond the scope of
this study. Still, it is curious that most studies on land tenure systems and titling discuss
only the rights but not the obligations, which should be coupled in the modern nation-
state framework. It also needs to be questioned why the institution is often discussed
in economics; whereas, in most cases, it includes the legal system. Faundez (2016) is a
rare example that discusses law and development in terms of institutions based on North’s
argument. He criticizes North’s regarding law and the legal system as a ’black box’ and
that he does not consider their importance in the formation of institutions.
This point requires further study. Whether it be urban or rural, the mere imposition
of land or property tax without considering the possibility of property transactions or a
property-based credit system seems to be seriously flawed. A system that enables people
to hedge the risk of meeting the tax obligation is indispensable.
3.5. Limitations of the alternative systems
Whereas the early modern Japanese example suggests that one of the purposes of land-
based credit was the fulfillment of tax obligations, many other studies suggest that credit
was used for agricultural input and daily consumption smoothing, especially in illness,
marriage, or the death of family members. This implies that such conventional credit
systems only functioned to provide relatively small and short term credit, but not for large
scale investment. If so, we need to ask when and how consumer credit transforms into
commercial credit.
This point reflects the discrepancy among the arguments of institutionalists in that
one side infers the availability of collateral backed credit for investment whereas the other
deals mainly with credit as a social safety net. For example, the institutionalists’ argu-
ment suggests implicitly and explicitly that unregistered assets in developing countries
can become collateral in finance which can promote relatively large and long-term invest-
ment. This idea was the driving power behind the land titling projects implemented in
several countries. However, we need to recognize the theoretical jump between the studies
about productivity enhancement, poverty reduction in rural areas, and fostering financial
activities and investment.
Studies on Japanese modern economic history suggest the possibility that the new
landowner class, which gradually emerged through the Edo period, played a role in the
formation of the capitalist class and became the financial supporters of industries. For
example, Teranishi (2009) suggests that in the transition from the Edo to Meiji periods,
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of land or property tax without considering the possibility of property transactions or a
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to hedge the risk of meeting the tax obligation is indispensable.
3.5. Limitations of the alternative systems
Whereas the early modern Japanese example suggests that one of the purposes of land-
based credit was the fulfillment of tax obligations, many other studies suggest that credit
was used for agricultural input and daily consumption smoothing, especially in illness,
marriage, or the death of family members. This implies that such conventional credit
systems only functioned to provide relatively small and short term credit, but not for large
scale investment. If so, we need to ask when and how consumer credit transforms into
commercial credit.
This point reflects the discrepancy among the arguments of institutionalists in that
one side infers the availability of collateral backed credit for investment whereas the other
deals mainly with credit as a social safety net. For example, the institutionalists’ argu-
ment suggests implicitly and explicitly that unregistered assets in developing countries
can become collateral in finance which can promote relatively large and long-term invest-
ment. This idea was the driving power behind the land titling projects implemented in
several countries. However, we need to recognize the theoretical jump between the studies
about productivity enhancement, poverty reduction in rural areas, and fostering financial
activities and investment.
Studies on Japanese modern economic history suggest the possibility that the new
landowner class, which gradually emerged through the Edo period, played a role in the
formation of the capitalist class and became the financial supporters of industries. For
example, Teranishi (2009) suggests that in the transition from the Edo to Meiji periods,
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the growth rate of agricultural production declined, which encouraged the landowners to
invest in stocks and other securities. However, Teranishi also suggests that the share of in-
vestment by the landowners in the capital market was relatively small, and the majority of
the capital came from the former warrior class (shizoku), aristocrats (kazoku), and strong
merchants. This implies that it was not financial intermediation that fostered investment
in industry, but capitalists who accumulated wealth at the price of increasing economic
inequality and poverty at the bottom of the society.
4. Tentative remarks
This brief review of the institutions and systems that are alternatives to individual prop-
erty rights alludes to our belief in the indispensability and robustness of individual prop-
erty rights, especially in terms of economic growth, being built on a naive mosaic of eco-
nomic ideas.
The early modern Japanese experience confirms that the increase in productivity did
not begin with the consolidation of individual land property rights, but the causality is
the other way around. An economy can thrive without individual land property systems
and land titling. Japanese history also suggests that the credit system using land as a
pledge for pawning was closely correlated with the tax obligation. The necessity to meet the
communal tax obligation and production criteria gave rural people the incentive to transact
or pawn their piece of the communal land plots even though land sales were officially
prohibited. It also reveals that land transactions led to the gradual accumulation of land
in the hand of a small number of people, forming the landowner class and the emergence
of the landless poor. This implies that establishing individual land property rights systems
can never be a perfect or ideal solution to achieve inclusive growth or poverty reduction.
The necessity for resetting the system may be an intrinsic characteristic of the market
economy, given the fact that since the French revolution and introduction of proprietary
ideology in western countries, inequality in wealth has continued to widen until today,
with only the exception of a few decades after the economic and physical destruction due
to the World Wars (Piketty 2014; 2020).
While this study has offered a tentative discussion of the widely accepted belief in the
unequivocalness of land property rights, the following points require further investigation.
First, the early modern Japanese case reviewed in this study was the practice in rural
areas, but the distinction between agricultural land and urban land is necessary, and fur-
ther study on the asset-based credit systems in urban areas is required. This is even more
important, because in urban areas, elements such as tax rates, changes in the land price,
and interest rates need to be included in discussing the value of immovable assets. Second,
even though the conventional land-based credit system can function without individual
land property rights, the primary purpose of this system was consumption smoothing or
supplementing tax payments. The theoretical gap between the availability of collateral and
the increase in industrial investment based on the institutional view needs to be closed.
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